Freedom of expression and judicial independence

Abstract

This paper seeks to follow up on the case of the judge who was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for opinions expressed in an academic work on the performance of the Court during the military dictatorship. Thirteen years after what happened, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has reported that the solution reached by the Supreme Court is against the human rights of the judge in question, particularly against their freedom of expression, and orders, consequently, several measures: to cancel the sanction, to repair its consequences by means of compensatory measures and the modification of the norms that allow to attack the right to the freedom of expression of the judges in our country. The subsequent reaction of the Supreme Court to this news is quite encouraging. It is suggested that this reaction may constitute a clarification of the regime of restrictions on freedom of expression that judges should have and the importance that an adequate guarantee that this right has for the necessary judicial independence. To this end, the normative framework consisting of jurisprudential decisions of European and American human rights courts is reviewed.